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Act of 1986 deems this same change 
as a change in accounting principle.
For 1982, 1983, and 1984, massive 
FCT losses were reported by nearly 
all of the twelve largest U.S. banks 
(See Table 1). For example, Bank- 
America reported FTC losses of 
$32.2 million ($.22 per share), $46.6 
million ($.31 per share), and $44.8 
million ($.30 per share) for 1982, 
1983, and 1984, respectively. These 
sizable losses appear in BankAmer­
ica’s balance sheet but not in the 
income statement.
The Case of U.S. Multinational Banks u Unfortunately, the
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financial accounting 
disclosure requirements 
have not kept pace with 
the financial reporting 
creativity of the 
multinational banking 
system.
Strong global competition, ex­
treme interest rate and exchange 
rate volatility, and deregulation have 
prompted banks to enter into new 
fields and implement preferable ac­
counting methods to meet their tar­
geted profit growth. Unfortunately, 
the financial accounting disclosure 
requirements have not kept pace 
with the financial reporting creativ­
ity of the multinational banking sys­
tem. Under these circumstances, it 
is no surprise to see comments con­
cerning possibly misleading bank 
financial statements. Lissaker notes 
in a 1982 Washington Post article 
that “bank stocks have climbed in 
the bull market of recent months as 
the banks have reported higher earn­
ings. (In some cases, banks exag­
gerate their profit reports by failing 
to cover potential losses.)” [p. C4]. 
Moreover, a Wall Street Journal arti­
cle states that “the stock market is 
sending a message to the big banks. 
We don’t believe your earnings” 
[Hertzberg, p. 23]. Throughout 1985 
and 1986, and now in 1987, multina­
tional banks (MNBs) have continued 
to make headlines.
MNB profits are affected by a vari­
ety of factors. This paper discusses 
several important financial practices 
(e.g., foreign currency translation, 
and off-balance-sheet commitments 
and contingent liabilities) as they 
affect the income statements and 
balance sheets of U.S.-based MNBs. 
This discussion is important to ac­
counting practitioners, financial an­
alysts, MNB managers and acade­
micians.
The twelve largest U.S.-based 
MNBs were analyzed relative to their 
foreign currency translation (FCT) 
reporting practices for the years 1982 
through 1985. These MNBs were 
inconsistent in the method and de­
gree of disclosing their FCT gains 
(losses). Part of this problem rests 
with the flexibility allowed in defin­
ing the functional currency.
Assuming that the parent com­
pany is based in the U.S., manage­
ment can define the functional cur­
rency of the non-U.S. subsidiary as 
the U.S. dollar; thus, the FCT adjust­
ments are recognized in the income 
statement. If management defines 
the functional currency of the non­
U.S. subsidiary as any currency but 
the U.S. dollar, FCT adjustments are 
reported in the balance sheet.
In this way, reported earnings can 
reflect managerial preference, rather 
than a transaction or event external 
to the firm. For financial accounting, 
a change of the functional currency 
is similar to a change in estimate. 
For tax purposes, the Tax Reform
In 1982, when the recession and 
deregulation adversely affected the 
banking industry, all but one of the 
twelve largest U.S. MNBs elected to 
exclude net FCT adjustments from 
their income statements. The bank 
choosing to continue including 
translation adjustments in the in­
come statement was First Interstate. 
Beaver and Wolfson [1984] ques­
tioned the appropriateness of banks 
excluding translation adjustments 
from their income statements:
Banks make borrowing and 
lending decisions at a multi­
national level to exploit “per­
ceived” violations of interest 
rate parity among currencies. 
If the objective is to take advan­
tage of interest rate disparities, 
however, exclusion of transla­
tion gainsand losses from earn­
ings will obscure an evaluation 
of effectiveness of this specu­
lative activity [p. 33].
If MNB financial accounting prac­
tice is providing an unobscured view 
of performance, the FCT adjustment 
should correlate with economic re­
ality. When the U.S. dollar was 
strengthening against other curren­
cies, which was the case for 1982 
through 1984, FCT losses should
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TABLE 1
Largest Twelve U.S. Multinational Banks 
Net Translation Gain (Loss) or Adjustment for the Year
In Dollars (in Thousands) and Per Share
1982 1983 1984 1985
Citicorp (13,000) (39,000) (63,000) 18,000
per share (.10) (.32) (.50) .13
BankAmerica (32,182) (46,572) (44,773) 27,113
per share (.22) (.31) (.30) .18
Chase
Manhattan (13,921) (8,420) 3,611 (3,535)
per share (.21) (.12) .05 (.05)
Manufacturers
Hanover (184) a a a
per share (.01)
JP Morgan (5,000) (4,000) (11,000) 3,000
per share (.12) (.09) (.13) .03
Chemical (6,281) (13,692) (5,897) (1,622)
per share (.22) (.43) (.11) (.03)
Security
Pacific (6,739) (3,763) (8,935) 5,300
per share (.22) (.10) (.12) .07
Bankers
Trust (4,263) (6,960) (1,895) 65
per share (.16) (.24) (.06) .001
First
Interstate a a a a
First
Chicago (1,062) (1,904) (1,462) (8,252)
per share (.03) (.05) (.03) (.17)
Mellon (429) (419) (877) (1,388)
per share (.02) (.02) (.03) (.05)
Continental
Illinois (4,638) (5,542) -0- (3)
per share (.12) (.14) -0- (.01)
Source: Compiled by authors from annual reports 
a = Information not disclosed in annual report
have occurred. With the exception 
of Chase Manhattan in 1984, this 
indeed was the case for all of the 
banks studied (see Table 1). In 1985, 
when the U.S. dollar fell in value 
(relative to other currencies), FCT 
gains should have occurred. This 
was the case for Citicorp, Bank­
America, J.P. Morgan, BankersTrust 
and Security Pacific. The other MNBs 
analyzed either did not report (i.e., 
First Interstate) or reported net 
losses. The latter is probably attribu­
table to the combination of incorrect 
anticipation of the direction of ex­
change rate movements and the en­
gagements in forward exchange 
contracts and swaps which recently 
have grown in importance.
The spectacular growth in the 
present decade of several new fi­
nancial instruments has further ob­
scured evaluation of bank earnings 
partially due to diverse disclosure 
practices. For example, the com­
bined interest rate and currency 
swap (called a cross-currency inter­
est swap) is not addressed by the 
FASB [Wishon and Chevalier, p. 68].
Under the current provisions of 
Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) No. 52, exchange 
gains or losses for net investment 
hedges or foreign currency commit­
ments are excluded from net income 
determination. Management can, 
however, remove these hedges at 
any time while continuing deferral 
of the related exchange gains or 
losses. Thus, for currency swaps 
and forward exchange contracts 
(covered under SFAS No. 52), the 
established criteria “created the pos­
sibility that transaction gains or 
losses that should be reported in net 
income currently may instead be 
reported as translation adjustments 
or deferred as hedges of commit­
ments” [SFAS No. 52, p. 22].
Discretion in financial accounting 
disclosure of swaps and forward 
exchange contracts is a dilemma 
that is magnified by the reporting 
practices for standby letters of credit 
and guarantees. These are generally 
classified as off-balance-sheet com­
mitments and contingent liabilities, 
which are exposed to the fluctuating 
foreign currency exchange rates.
An analysis of the 1985 annual 
reports of those twelve largest MNBs 
previously mentioned, reveals di­
versity in the manner and magnitude 
of disclosure of the off-balance- 
sheet financial instruments. A sim­
ilar transaction may be omitted or 
disclosed differently by the MNBs. 
Despite the different financial posi­
tion and risk exposure created by 
the various kinds of swaps (“un­
matched,” “matched,” “hedged,” and 
“offsetting” swaps that are different 
methods of valuation and income 
recognition) [Wishon and Chevalier, 
p. 74], not all of the MNBs disclosed 
which method they applied in ac­
counting for swaps and the recogni­
tion of the gains or losses resulting 
from the changes in value. Nor did 
all of the MNBs display the separate 
amounts of their standby letters of 
credit.
In 1982, when the 
recession and 
deregulation adversely 
affected the banking 
industry, all but one of 
the twelve largest U.S. 
MNBs elected to exclude 
net FCT adjustments 
from their income 
statements.
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Fee revenue generated from these 
off-balance-sheet commitments can 
be recognized currently or over the 
life of the contracts. However, out of 
the twelve MNBs examined, not all 
of the MNBs disclosed the timing 
recognition of fees received from 
standby letters of credit. The related 
fees were recognized over the life of 
the contracts. Some MNBs recog­
nized fees received from interest­
rate swap arrangements currently, 
while other MNBs recognized these 
fees over the term of the matched 
swap agreements.
However, out of the 
twelve MNBs examined, 
not all the MNBs 
disclosed the charging of 
these possible losses to 
the Reserve for Possible 
Loan Losses or the 
incorporation of the risks 
associated with standby 
letters of credit or off- 
balance-sheet 
agreements and 
obligations in their credit 
loss estimations.
Banks act as both intermediaries 
and guarantors for these instru­
ments. Possibly customers will de­
fault on their obligations. However, 
out of the twelve MNBs examined, 
not all of the MNBs disclosed the 
charging of these possible losses to 
the Reserve for Possible Loan Losses 
or the incorporation of the risks 
associated with standby letters of 
credit or off-balance-sheet agree­
ments and obligations in their credit 
loss estimations. MNBs’ diverse dis­
closure practices for potential losses 
may be due to the lack of specific 
financial accounting guidelines for 
these banking services.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper provides a context for 
understanding how some U.S. mul­
tinational banks account for and 
disclose foreign currency transla­
tion, off-balance-sheet commitments 
and contingent liabilities. Financial 
accounting practices, in light of 
SFAS No. 52, have been analyzed for 
the years 1982 through 1985. This 
analysis reveals that although SFAS 
No. 52 may have settled some issues, 
many issues remain. Fortunately, the 
Financial Accounting Standards 
Board is addressing the issue of 
improving “disclosures about finan­
cial instruments and off-balance- 
sheetfinancing and hedging arrange­
ments” [News Report, p. 14]. How­
ever, unless the accounting profes­
sion acts promptly to curb the wide 
diversity in disclosure and measure­
ment practices used by the multina­
tional banking community, the cred­
ibility of both the financial account­
ing profession and the MNBs will be 
in jeopardy.Ω
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